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To see oneself is to see through the eyes of the other, but this 
other is not another who stands outside of one’s own mind. 
This other is the other through which one is oneself, through 
which one is made oneself. I am but a fiction, as is she. This 
is not to say that we are not. We are indeed, but the we pre-
sented here are a fiction insofar as all truth must be told as a 
fiction, for all told truth has the structure of narration. Narra-
tion must be narrated from a point of view. One might have 
chosen to narrate the truth of oneself through the first person, 
but the first-person narrator cannot tell the story of esteem.
Esteem is the truth of oneself through the eyes of the 
other, and any truth of esteem must be told from the per-
spective of that other, through the spectating other. Thus, 
any story of esteem is veiled. The truth of one self is always 
hidden to oneself when esteem is concerned, for there is no 
such thing as self-esteem. Esteem must come from the other 
who is in one’s own mind. What is mistaken for self-esteem 
is but a translation of the dis-course of desire. And it’s for 
this reason that I must write of her. And who, exactly, am I? 
I am not one person, nor am I an amalgamation of people 
who have loved her. I’m not a representation of a person or 
of people but the discourse through which she is a woman 
longing for air. I have been lent her voice. I am the transla-
tor through which she is now speaking. The translator is the 
producer of the discourse that suffocates her and allows her 
to breathe in gasped breaths, the producer of the discourse 
that both takes away her voice and gives her voice.
She herself is not who she is, though she is indeed 
another who is. She must exist, but it must be that she 
remains veiled to both of us who are presented in this dis-
course. She must remain veiled, and she is indeed veiled by 
this discourse, which is not, in actuality, my own.
Riddle and Accident
Auspices
She’s very aware of the landscape. When I’m around her, I 
can only be very aware of her. When we were sitting on her 
porch, she pointed out a cardinal—or what must’ve been a 
cardinal. I only saw a small red spot perched atop a wire. 
As a child, I had a pair of binoculars. I received them on the 
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pretense that I had wanted to watch birds. From time to 
time, I’d use my gift as intended. Bird watching, however, 
proved to be difficult. It seemed that the birds knew they 
were being seen. I had convinced myself that watching 
them made them fly away, but perhaps they flew away on 
their own. As an adult, I’m not fully unconvinced. Still, I 
think the ancients were right. With keen interpretation, how 
the birds fly can tell you something.
Caesarean Birth
One of my favorite jazz vocalists is Beverly Kenney. Her 
voice is special. It has sophistication, although if you’ve 
heard it, you might describe it as girlish. This, however, is 
only one side of Kenney’s voice, the surface. There’s 
another side, a side of depth, a depth that’s perhaps best left 
deep and undisturbed by those uninvited, a depth that 
should be left on its side of the veil.
There’s a fascinating article about her by Jonathan 
Schwartz from which I’ll quote liberally. It appeared in the 
November 1992 issue of GQ. The title is ironic, referencing 
the same quality one hears if one listens only superficially. 
It’s called “Girl Singer.”
A friend, Millie Perkins, describes Kenney this way:
Everyday life was difficult for her. You see, she knew 
things I didn’t know. She was the only person who 
knew who I was inside. She was somehow haunted, 
and at the same time so kind and so unselfish, with so 
much patience for other people. She had an amazing 
awareness of what the human condition really was.
Next, is the most touching description of a one-night 
stand that I can imagine. It comes from Ivan Mogull, remi-
niscing at age 70:
Then Beverly and I went back to my apartment. We’d 
never touched each other before. I was just knocked 
out by her singing. We listened to music. I remember 
exactly what we listened to. The guy was a Chilean 
singer, Lucho Gatica. He really turned us on. And 
Sinatra’s “Wee Small Hours.” And Nat’s “Love Is the 
Thing.” And we listened to Charles Aznavour. And we 
danced, and then Beverly took me by the hand. It was 
the greatest night of my life. She was just so natural 
and gifted. It wasn’t vulgar or anything. You know 
something? One of the things I remember the most is 
Beverly licking the rim of her glass. She did that all the 
time, and she did it that night. That was our only night.
This is Kenney herself. It’s an unpublished poem:
On Cesarean [sic] Birth
I curled my body small
in hiding
to escape the view
of those who sought to start the flow
of waters long since overdue.
And watched in horror
Cautious silver
part the roof of my Capri
And heard the cry of anguished protest,
The first of many wrought from me.
It isn’t the subtlest poetry, but it isn’t awful. One gathers 
that she couldn’t stand to be looked at. She has a point about 
forced birth, though.
What I won’t quote, maybe because it bothers me, is the 
stuff about her time with Milton Klonsky, the poet. He 
inspired her, and she was deeply in love with him, but appar-
ently he left her. There’s some speculation that this was the 
reason for her suicide, but I think that this, too, is only the 
truth of the surface. She used alcohol and sleeping pills.
Lastly, there are five photos in the article. She’s smiling 
in all of them, but she looks to be at peace in only two. 
There’s a picture of her on a beach, the only picture where 
she’s looking far into the landscape rather than into the 
camera. She’s looking, but not returning a look. The second 
happy picture shows her arm in arm with George Shearing. 
Shearing, of course, was blind.
Unforgettable
The exigency of the lost does not entail being remem-
bered and commemorated; rather, it entails remaining 
in us and with us as forgotten, and in this way and 
only in this way, remaining unforgettable. (Agamben, 
2005, p. 40)
If forgetting exists, it can’t be something accumulated, 
something gathered together to form of a collection. Never 
can I recite a litany of things that I’ve forgotten. But how is 
it that the lost should remain with us as forgotten, for forget-
ting, it would seem, is something that doesn’t remain with 
us? The lost can only do this if the lost object becomes for 
us something unforgettable, and the unforgettable itself 
must be an object that’s emptied of its qualities. The unfor-
gettable object must be a shell, a surface, a veil that remains 
after the object partitioned from us has gone away. The 
unforgettable is the empty signifier, a mute signifier that 
stands in for I know not what. The unforgettable is the 
proper name belonging to an object. The proper name rig-
idly designates an object through a primal baptism, not 
through a collection of descriptions. But what produces the 
unforgettable?
Is it mourning that makes the lost object unforgettable? 
No, for mourning is what disinvests us from the lost object. 
Mourning doesn’t gut the object of its essence. It removes 
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the part of ourselves that we had put into the object. Is it 
nostalgia that gives the lost object the status of being unfor-
gettable? No, for nostalgia is a type of commemoration, an 
act of memorializing. Furthermore, it installs the temporal 
veil of used to be or has not yet been. This veil isn’t the 
empty signifier of the unforgettable.
What makes something unforgettable is unconditional 
love. The love object transforms into the unforgettable in 
the midst of loss. And if the unforgettable must be an object 
that’s emptied of its qualities, it must’ve been this way 
before the occurrence of loss. There’s no need to empty the 
qualities of an object that’s no longer accessible. In fact, if 
the love object had not been emptied of its qualities at the 
time of loss, this would be an obstruction to mourning. 
Mourning empties the love object of one’s investment. To 
take the qualities of the love object as what’s to be emptied 
out is to be mistaken about how to mourn.
Unconditional love loves the love object without recourse 
to its qualities. Unconditional love is the love of an idea of 
the love object. But is this to disparage unconditional love? 
Is this to make unconditional love but a nonsense? Not nec-
essarily. To dismiss unconditional love as nonsense is to 
misunderstand how it comes to be. Remember that though 
unconditional love doesn’t have an object, unconditional 
love is caused. That which is esteemed is the object cause of 
unconditional love. Thus, though unconditional love is 
caused by qualities, it doesn’t take those qualities as its 
object. It loves the love object such as it is, as whatever it is. 
It empties the qualities from the object insofar as loving the 
object with all its qualities makes those qualities external to 
the object. Unconditional love loves, but it can’t take the 
object as an object, for its end is to perpetuate itself, not to 
arrive and captivate. Unconditional love is maintained with-
out the merit-worthy, yet it’s esteem that catalyzes it.
At bottom, unconditional love is there because one is 
smart, attractive, and knows a joke about a panda. Those are 
things that cause one to be unforgettable. And because those 
qualities become external to the love object insofar as they 
aren’t what maintain the love, it wouldn’t matter, for 
instance, if one screws up the punch line and says that the 
definition for panda reads that it eats leaves and shoots.
Symposium
And why all this longing for propagation? Because 
this is the one deathless and eternal element in our 
mortality. And since we have agreed that the lover 
longs for the good to be his own forever, it follows 
that we are bound to long for immortality as well as 
for the good—which is to say that Love is a longing 
for immortality. (Plato, Symposium, 1961, p. 207a)
Like a good Irish stout, ancient Greek drunk talk is really 
heady. The head of this vignette is what Diotima teaches 
Socrates about love. Love is a longing for immortality, and 
this longing is fulfilled through propagation. In other words, 
what forestalls death is perpetual birthing. But this doesn’t 
really work. Although she claims that propagation is the one 
deathless and eternal element in our mortality, it’s deathless 
and eternal for humanity as a whole, not for any particular 
human. This is to confuse the totality for what’s universal. 
What all humans share is that their lives are a sum of forces 
that resist death. So what can we say about love for the par-
ticular human?
If we’re to conceptualize love in terms of immortality, 
we should take into account two important contravening 
components constituting immortality. First, immortality in 
the human is achieved only when the potential for death 
has been exhausted. Second, if immortality is to be expe-
rienced deathlessly as Diotima suggests, then it must be 
the experience of a nonbecoming being, the experience of 
a being that’s changeless. The individual human can only 
exhaust the potential for death by dying, but nonbecoming 
can only be experienced by living through repetition. The 
compulsive drives are the closest that these contravening 
tendencies come to being resolved. The drives seek the 
immortality of death and try to forestall the inevitable 
through their repetitive, just-once-more, nature. It’s for 
this reason that all drives are death drives. To blindly fol-
low the drives is in some way to stop resisting death. Still, 
the drives can’t achieve their end. It’s for this reason that the 
drives are only ever partial. They’re partial because they 
must take partial objects. Otherwise, they’d achieve the 
death they aren’t supposed to. It’s in this way that the 
drives differ from desire. Desire doesn’t take an object, 
and unlike the plurality of drives, desire is unary. One 
might describe the drives as longings, but desire isn’t 
really a longing. Longings always take an object. The 
drives can be longings because they do in fact have objects. 
Desire, rather than being a longing, is often characterized 
by an unanswered question, a riddle, an enigma. What is 
this question? It’s the question of “Who am I for your 
desire?” In what Diotima describes, the lovers don’t really 
have a question. They know what they want, or at least 
they’ll make concerted efforts in that direction: At bottom, 
what Diotima offers isn’t a theory of love, but a theory of 
the drives, a theory of sexuality.
It’s interesting, we might note, that the kind of sex that 
can result in propagation can be an unnecessarily risky 
behavior nowadays. Best not to get so drunk at symposia 
lest we fail to remember this.
The Sphinx
What the Sphinx proposed was not simply something 
whose signified is hidden and veiled under an “enigmatic” 
signifier, but a mode of speech in which the original frac-
ture of presence was alluded to in the paradox of a word 
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that approaches its object while keeping it indefinitely at a 
distance:
Like the Sphinx that utters it, the enigma belongs to 
the sphere of the apotropaic, that is, to a protective 
power that repels the uncanny by attracting it and 
assuming it within itself. (Agamben, 1993a, p. 138)
Agamben is right here. Often, what’s focused on in the 
myth of the Sphinx is her monstrousness, her cruelty of eat-
ing those who can’t answer her. This, however, is to miss 
the point. The Sphinx is apotropaic, protective. It’s part of 
the tragedy that Oedipus destroyed her by connecting the 
signified to the signifier. Because of his destructive answer, 
Oedipus left no one to protect Thebes in her absence. 
Oedipus’ entrance into Thebes, of course, wasn’t exactly a 
glorious homecoming.
One lesson we can learn is that it isn’t that the enigma 
just veils in the hiding kind of way, but in the partitioning 
way, and sometimes the enigma must be left intact as an 
enigma. The enigma installs a necessary distance. 
Sometimes distances are necessary. Without distance, for 
instance, we wouldn’t be able to experience the aura of 
nature. The will to truth isn’t always a virtue.
The Veil of Isis
For Nietzsche, to will the truth at all costs, to wish for 
knowledge for its own sake, and to renounce vital 
illusions would be to risk destroying humanity. The 
will to truth is fundamentally a will to death. (Hadot, 
2006, p. 286)
In the above passage, Pierre Hadot is reflecting on 
Nietzsche’s own reflections on lifting the veil of nature. 
Hadot’s book in general traces reformulations of a fragment 
from Heraclitus, a fragment often translated as: “Nature loves 
to hide.” Nietzsche equates nature with the Sphinx, and to lift 
the veil of nature is to cause destruction, to break nature’s 
most sacred laws. Of course, this is what Oedipus does.
Giving us a reading of the preface of The Gay Science, 
Hadot tells us, “The refusal expressed there to unveil what 
is hidden leads to the resolute decision to stick to that which 
veils, that which is not hidden” (p. 291). Yet another lesson 
we should take from Oedipus is that there’s a superficiality 
the comes from a profundity, from an understanding that the 
will to truth can be a will to death.
The Uniqueness of Commonality
In the Symposium Plato tells us about the full original 
resonance of the word poiesis: “Any cause that brings 
into existence something that was not there before is 
poiesis.” Every time that something is pro-duced, that 
is, brought from concealment and nonbeing into the 
light of presence, there is poiesis, pro-duction, poetry. 
(Agamben, 1999, pp. 59-60)
She has a Duchamp lithograph. When we were loading 
her bicycle into my car, she had to take the front wheel off 
to make it fit. I almost made a joke about her having a 
reproduction of Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel. I decided not 
to on account that I had already failed with my misfired 
joke about a Balzac who didn’t exist. Anyway, I’m won-
dering whether she wrote the poem she gave me on that 
bike. She said she thought of it on her bike ride home, but 
she has two. This one was a gift from an ex. But Duchamp’s 
readymades.
The aura of an original work of art, the aura of the result 
of an instance of poiesis, is a distance. There’s not only the 
distance between the work of art and its spectator but also 
the distance of the work of art to its origin. “Originality,” 
Agamben notes, “means proximity to the origin. The work 
of art is original because it maintains a particular relation-
ship to its origin” (p. 61). If the aura of an original work of 
art degrades in the mechanical reproduction, then the ready-
made, being something mechanically reproduced already, 
inverts those distances. First, the proximity of the work of 
art to its origin is transposed to the distance between the 
spectator and the work of art. Being a common object, 
there’s no ritualistic distance that we must keep to it. We’re 
more proximate. However, the distance normally occurring 
between the work of art and the spectator finds itself trans-
posed to the space normally occupied by the work of art and 
the proximity to its origin. Instead of this distance being a 
close one, the readymade estranges itself from its origin.
In the readymade, Duchamp’s contribution was to 
make poetry—poetry in the broad sense that we find it in 
the Symposium—from the re-produced. In other words, he 
pro-duced—brought to the light of presence something that 
had remained partitioned away as concealed—something 
that’s impossible to re-produce. Re-production is made 
impossible because in order to produce the readymade, he 
went round the screen. He brought forth something not 
there from the side of the there already. The readymade isn’t 
special. In some sense, it isn’t meant to be spectated, isn’t 
meant to be looked at aesthetically. There can be no poetics 
of the readymade.
Thus, the opposite of her lithograph, there can be no 
mechanically reproduced readymade. The readymade is 
unique because it’s common. Its uniqueness owes to the 
context in which we find it. Namely, Duchamp took it from 
the other side of the partition, put it on display, and thus 
baptized it as art. And isn’t this what we find in singularity? 
The singular has the same quality that makes the readymade 
not a mere re-production, but an instance of poiesis. In the 
singular, we find what we might call the uniqueness of 
commonality.
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I’m Nuts About You | Whatever, I Love You
The Whatever in question here relates to singularity 
not in its indifference with respect to a common 
property, but only in its being such as it is. Singularity 
is thus freed from the false dilemma that obliges 
knowledge to choose between the ineffability of the 
individual and the intelligibility of the universal. 
The singularity exposed as such is whatever you 
want, that is, lovable. Love is never directed toward 
this or that property of the loved one, but neither 
does it neglect the properties in favor of an insipid 
generality. The lover wants the loved one with all of 
its predicates, its being such as it is. (Agamben, 
1993b, pp. 1-2)
In an oddly Lacanian way, Agamben opens The Coming 
Community with the passage above. However, what he adds 
is that not only is the unconditional love proper to desire not 
directed toward this or that property of the loved one, but 
the loved one is loved with all of its predicates. But what 
can it mean that the loved one is loved with all of its 
predicates?
Again, this can only mean that unconditional love doesn’t 
have an object. Whatever being—the quodlibet ens—cannot 
be an object, because that being is a being such as it is, a 
being that has become what it is, whatever that is. Yes, it’s 
still caused by smart, attractive, panda, but once it’s in 
motion, unconditional love allows one to be smart, attrac-
tive, panda, and whatever. What Agamben writes about here 
is the practice of unconditional love. We should note the 
implication that unconditional love can’t be given to just 
anyone. It’s different from, let’s say, a universal love for 
humanity. Unconditional love is directed toward not this 
insipid generality, but toward a singular being, a being such 
as it is, toward a constellation of predicates.
The singular being is neither the individual nor the uni-
versal. Rather, it’s the exemplary, an example, an instance 
having the potential of becoming a universal. The singular 
is universalizable. It’s in this way that we should under-
stand the uniqueness of commonality. It isn’t that common-
ality has uniqueness as one of its properties. Rather, in the 
singular, uniqueness can come to belong to the gesture 
toward the identification of a commonality. To think in 
terms of Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel, all one would have to 
do is detach it from its stool, go round the screen again, and 
attach it to her bike.
I’ll Remember All Winter Long
The early morning hike, the rented tandem bike, the 
lunches that we used to pack. We never could explain 
that sudden summer rain, the looks we got when we 
got back. (“The Things We Did Last Summer”)
As I said, Beverly Kenney is one of my favorite vocalists, 
but knowing how she died, I can’t listen to her work often. 
Actually, I rarely get through an entire album. Still, I under-
stand. She’s sophisticated. Her voice points to her wisdom, a 
wisdom of which she has an excess. The wisdom is her veil, 
and it’s this wisdom that splits her. It must’ve been painful, 
and she seems to be the type to have suffered quietly. I 
wouldn’t doubt that she would’ve mistaken concern for pity, 
care for intrusion. You can hear that she’d rather not let peo-
ple know her depth. Whether it’s not to be a burden or 
because it makes her feel too exposed can only be unclear to 
anyone who really listens, unclear because she herself is 
confused. Still, in spite of herself, every syllable is a confes-
sion, even her silence, but again, only to those who can lis-
ten. And those who can listen must know to only listen.
She has a version of “The Things We Did Last Summer.” 
Unlike other versions you’re likely to hear, she interprets it 
correctly. It’s heartbreaking. Still, with Kenney gone in the 
way she is, I prefer to listen to the indefatigably upbeat ver-
sion that’s on the album Nancy Wilson cut with George 
Shearing, The Swingin’s Mutual. Sure, Wilson’s interpreta-
tion is really pop friendly in the bad way, but in her absence, 
Kenney’s rendition is unbearable.
It must be that when the special is thrust into something 
nondialectical, into a completion in the terminal sense, thrust 
into a nonpreserving destruction, the memory itself becomes 
insufferable. The memorial of the recorded isn’t comforting, 
but a reminder of a completion that cannot result in a collec-
tion. There’s not a gathering together into a unity, but the 
opposite: the rending apart of what was also once singular into 
fragments. One can only find comfort in the fantasy of being 
able to forget, but we can’t help but know better. Mogull, 
recall, was 70. At best there’s only not remembering.
I sometimes imagine what it might’ve been like to have 
been close to her when she stopped resisting death. I’m not 
necessarily talking about the night of her suicide. There are 
many ways in which we stop resisting death. Suicide is just 
one way among many. But what would I have done?
Panicked, I could panic. In desperation, I could plead 
with her to live using the fact of her beauty as my appeal, but 
she’s already convinced of it and is dying in spite of it. With 
reflection, I could let her know that though I’d rather be 
there for her birth, if this weren’t a possibility, I’d in any case 
want to be there for her. And while this seems to be the 
soundest response, it’s also the saddest. I might’ve done this. 
Still, I would’ve told her some jokes first. I have many, a few 
of them funny. I recently learned a good one about what one 
should expect from engaging in bestiality with a panda.
Eats, Shoots, and Leaves
When all is said and done, I have more than one face. 
I don’t know which is laughing at which. (Bataille, 
1994, p. 68)
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The comic does not exist outside the pale of what is 
strictly human. A landscape may be beautiful, charm-
ing and sublime, or insignificant and ugly; it will 
never be laughable. Indifference is its natural envi-
ronment, for laughter has no greater foe than emo-
tion. I do not mean that we could not laugh at a 
person who inspires us with pity, for instance, or even 
with affection, but in such a case we must, for the 
moment, put our affection out of court and impose 
silence upon our pity. (Bergson, 2005, p. 2)
I love to hear her laugh. It had been a rare pleasure, 
though. I wasn’t often able to elicit it from her. Inexplicably, 
my usually charming self-deprecation had turned into sar-
casm. Perhaps it was nervousness. I don’t know. Also, what 
would’ve been otherwise good jokes—jokes that weren’t 
mere snippiness—were ones making allusions to things that 
don’t actually exist, things, for instance, like Henri de 
Balzac. Yet she’s gracious, patient.
When I’ve heard her laugh, it’s genuine, tempered with 
an almost imperceptible hesitation. It’s almost as though 
she feels obliged to moderate her beauty, as though it would 
be too overwhelming. In a way, it is. Her laughter is unfor-
gettable. With regard to the expression on her visage, she 
wrinkles her nose, both unforgettable and adorable. This is 
the visage, but what of the laughing face? One would natu-
rally have “more than one” for the reason that the face is 
never captured by the accumulative, by collectible instances, 
but by the amalgamated dissolved into totality.
If in the face, one exists singularly, existing while retain-
ing all of one’s properties only as points of nonidentifica-
tion, if in the face what comes to be exposed is the open 
communicative potential behind which we hide and stay 
hidden, then our question should be, “What is communi-
cated by the laughing face?”
Laughter is a gesture. Gestures are generally indexes 
pointing to the ineffable, but laughter as a gesture could 
point to the fact that there’s nothing to say. The gesture of 
laughter communicates not through symbolization but 
through the natural index. Just as smoke indicates fire, 
laughter indicates that communication has been able to 
achieve its own inoperativity. Laughter points to an absence 
of emotion, to the being without sentiment. A laughing face, 
then is an indifferent one, indifferent in its expression—for 
faces, remember, can have no expression—and indifferent 
in its nondistinctive singularity. This isn’t at all the bad 
indifference of refused desire. It’s the indifference of relief, 
of having no need to articulate the question of desire 
because one’s desire is matched by responsive, responsible 
care from the lover. To have nothing to express is to exhale 
stale air and to inhale the air of levity, the air unburdened 
by emotion. Jokes may veil an unspeakable truth, but 
laughter laughs out that truth. Through laughter there’s 
escape. Laughter allows us to be born and to cultivate our 
own growth. Laughter, at bottom, is the index of eudai-
monia, of the nonaffective happiness constituting human 
flourishing, the same happiness that is the most demanding 
test of all for lovers.
I’m afraid that her rare laughter might’ve been some-
thing also pointing to her being full of sentiment, full of 
invested emotional attunements that yielded no return. 
Still, she hadn’t become bored with him. Instead, she had 
waited and was herself consumed by what had burned her 
and by what had burned in her. I couldn’t laugh for the 
reason that I was also overwhelmed, not with pity, but 
with concern.
Anyway, here’s something funny regarding one of her 
favorite authorities, one who actually does exist. Maybe she 
could use it as a title for something:
I see that I have Bourdieu, Pierre.
Naming and Necessity
The nature and character of a love is most sharply 
defined by the fate that links it to someone’s name—
the person’s first name. In this sense the Divine 
Comedy is nothing but the aura surrounding the name 
of Beatrice, the most powerful representation of the 
idea that all the forces and figures of the cosmos arise 
from the name born of love. (Benjamin, “Short 
Shadows—I,” 2005, p. 268)
What she finds in the man she loves is her image and 
her name as a woman. Beatric. (Leclaire, 1998, p. 25)
To live in intimacy with a stranger, not in order to 
draw him closer, or to make him known, but rather to 
keep him strange, remote: unapparent—so unappar-
ent that his name contains him entirely. (Agamben, 
1995, p. 61)
Two people who are in love are attached above all 
else to their names. (Walter Benjamin, One-Way 
Street, 2004, p. 467)
1. Why the first name? This is the person’s proper 
name. It isn’t the family name that one can share 
with, let’s say, a linguist. It’s a rigid designator, 
and if you’re familiar with Saul Kripke’s Nam-
ing and Necessity, you know that rigid designa-
tors point to their referent without any reference 
to qualities. Proper names are often common, 
but the one iteration of it still rigidly designates. 
The singularity stuff fits here well. So that whole 
unconditional love thing? A shorthand for it could 
be “I love you, Mel.” And oh yes, I’m writing you 
a book, too. Yes, I know Divine Comedy is techni-
cally an epic poem.
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2. I think Leclaire is referencing the same thing 
as above. But being the psychoanalyst that 
he is—and sort of a Lacanian—he adds the 
image. The image here is the one in the dualistic 
imaginary—imaginary having nothing to do with 
the imagination, but with the three orders of the 
real, symbolic, and imaginary. The imaginary is 
what’s at play in the mirror stage, hence the find-
ing her image in the man she loves part. Remember 
that whole, “What’s the color of a mirror” thing? 
It was a riddle. I guess I’m sort of a Lacanian, too.
3. Uh-oh.
4. Not uh-oh.
5. Pellegrino
What is Aura? The experience of aura rests on the 
transposition of a form of reaction normal in human 
society to the relationship of nature to people. The 
one who is seen or believes himself to be seen 
[glances up] answers with a glance. To experience the 
aura of an appearance or a being means becoming 
aware of its ability [to pitch] to respond to a glance. 
This ability is full of poetry. (Benjamin, 2007, p. 45)
The passage above is similar to what Benjamin will 
claim in “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility.” However, it’s taken from his archive. 
Interestingly, these words are written on advertisement sta-
tionery for S. Pellegrino, and it’s hard not to interpret this as 
at least minimally significant.
In “The Work of Art,” he notes the devaluation of the 
here and now in the technologically reproduced, things such 
as “a landscape moving past the spectator in a film” 
(Benjamin, 2004, p. 254). With regard to the aura of nature 
specifically, he writes:
The concept of the aura can be usefully illustrated 
with reference to an aura of natural objects. We 
define the aura as the unique apparition of a distance, 
however near it may be. To follow with the eye a 
mountain range on the horizon or a branch that casts 
its shadow on the beholder is to breathe the aura of 
those mountains, of that branch. (p. 255)
And what’s bottled mineral water but this same degrada-
tion? One can imagine drinking at the springs themselves. 
No matter how close one gets to the natural object, it 
remains distant. There’s always something just beyond our 
vision, something that we may breathe—in our case, 
drink—but not see. Nature remains veiled, remains on the 
other side of the partition. But when we bottle the water, the 
distance becomes degraded. The here and now of the springs 
comes conveniently to us in a green bottle with a red star. S. 
Pellegrino’s logo has apparently not changed. There can be 
no exchange of glances with the bottled water for the reason 
of the lack of distance. It’s too close to see.
But when aura remains, what of this ability that’s full of 
poetry? It’s the poetry in the sense of poiesis. For instance, 
becoming more aware of how she responded to my glance 
did in fact bring forth what I’m now writing. She has her 
own muse, but she’s mine. She’s my muse for the reason 
that she’s hidden, for the reason that she’s in the distance 
beyond the partition. Romanticism aside, I don’t want a 
muse, but a fellow musician. The muses sing through you 
because they dictate; a fellow musician breathes with you. 
And when the breathing is in sync, there, too, is music—just 
like Waldron and “Lady Day.”
Speaking of glances, though, she once asked me why I 
kept offering her beers, the beers she herself bought, actu-
ally. Did I think it made her easy, she asked. No, beer always 
makes me more handsome. Mutatis mutandis, I only needed 
the mineral water, the mineral water she suggested I bring 
for what was to be our missed beach rendezvous. Though I 
usually prefer Perrier, for some reason I had chosen S. 
Pellegrino.
The Muse
That a hiddenness be maintained in order that there 
be disclosure, a forgetfulness maintained in order that 
there be memory, this is inspiration, the rapture of the 
muses which brings man, word, and thought into 
accord with one another. But this hiddenness is also 
the infernal core around which the obscurity of char-
acter and of destiny thickens; the non-said, growing 
in thought, precipitates it into madness. (Agamben, 
1995, p. 59)
Infernal indeed. Just as infernal as the first part of Divine 
Comedy. Well, there’s always hope or getting drunk. Both 
work. I shouldn’t have let her finish off so much of that beer.
30 and Singular
To love another being means to desire its species, that 
is, to desire the desire with which it desires to perse-
vere in its being. In this sense, special being is the 
being that is common or generic, and this is some-
thing like the image or the face of humanity. And 
special being does not mean the individual, identified 
by this or that quality which belongs exclusively to it. 
On the contrary, it means a being insofar as it is what-
ever being, a being such that it is. “Whatever being is 
desirable” is a tautology. (Agamben, 2007, p. 58)
Agamben opens The Coming Community, as I said, in 
an oddly Lacanian way. I said oddly not because it’s odd 
to be a Lacanian, but because Agamben is thoroughly 
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non-Lacanian here, in Profanations. Below, again, is what 
he says in The Coming Community:
Love is never directed toward this or that property of 
the loved one, but neither does it neglect the proper-
ties in favor of an insipid generality. The lover wants 
the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such 
as it is. (Agamben, 1993b, pp. 1-2)
If one compares the passages, it’s as though they come 
from two different minds. In the first, love is directed 
toward the special being, and this is a being that’s common 
or generic. In the second, this same idea is derided as “an 
insipid generality” toward which, among other things, love 
isn’t directed. But where’s the mistake?
The mistake, I think, lies in two places. First, Agamben 
has a strange understanding of desire in Profanations. In the 
chapter before, he places desire in the realm of images, 
what’s in Lacanian parlance the imaginary, in the order of 
dualism and identification. Desire actually belongs in the 
symbolic. The symbolic order is actually tertiary in struc-
ture. The third element is the signifier, that which makes 
possible communicative potentiality—this isn’t present in 
the imaginary space of images and reflections. Second, 
Agamben goes wrong in trying to assimilate special being 
to whatever being, this when he had already connected 
whatever being to singularity. In other words, he conflated 
by association the idea of specialness and singularity. 
They’re different.
Admittedly, I had made the same mistake. I had mis-
taken her for special, but what she is is singular. Special and 
species both derive from the Latin spectare, to look. 
Agamben knows this, and he’s right to put both in the imag-
inary order. As I said, he’s gets it wrong only when he puts 
desire in the imaginary. It’s identification that has the dual-
istic character of the look. In identification, the question is, 
“Who am I?” This is a question involving specialness. 
There’s an ideological pressure to be special, and often, 
strangely enough, those who feel the pressure of the ques-
tion find the look of the other to be invasive. Think of 
Beverly Kenney’s poem, for instance. Furthermore, the 
question I asked her about the color of the mirror was a 
riddle. The answer isn’t a color that’s in the spectrum, for 
the mirror is absolutely reflective, and color is the absorp-
tion of certain wavelengths. So, like the answer to the riddle 
of the Sphinx, the answer here is man. Leclaire knows this, 
too. But again, this is the answer for someone asking the 
question of a special being, a being who’s spectated, a being 
who’s looked at.
The question of someone desiring is different. Here the 
signifier is introduced. To borrow a term from Laplanche—
though Lacan wouldn’t necessarily agree—the signifier is 
an enigmatic one. In desire, that enigmatic signifier is the 
question of, “Who am I for your desire?”
This question mustn’t have an answer. Like the enigma, 
it’s a seductive question. Many will try to answer it, but it, 
too, is like the question of the Sphinx. If the question is 
answered, it’s generally only answered incorrectly. It’s pos-
sible that one bores of those who try to answer only ever in 
vain. If there’s a correct answer, it mustn’t be spoken. The 
answer must be a gesture. Let’s remember that answering 
her riddle with discourse was to destroy the Sphinx. So 
what’s to be done? Two gestural responses occur to me, 
only one of them good.
One thing to do is to merely hear the question. The ques-
tion may be posed often and in various iterations, but one 
can choose to only hear. In other words, one hears with 
understanding, but remains unresponsive. This is the irre-
sponsible way. Lovers have responsibility toward each 
other, and inattentiveness is a shirking of a duty. 
Unresponsiveness might captivate, keep her from becoming 
bored, but this isn’t the way of desire.
The other response is to listen to the question. Listening 
is an attentiveness. To listen requires the symbolic order, 
that which makes communication possible. One should 
understand that what the question of desire indexes is a 
need for communication, not necessarily the need for an 
answer of certitude. Listening is, in fact, responsive com-
munication. It’s responsive communication insofar as the 
listener is moved to act upon the said insofar as that listener 
strains toward a possible meaning, one that isn’t immedi-
ately accessible, one that’s accessible only through the 
mediation of the veil. Listening can be a type of waiting. 
Furthermore, one must listen until the question no longer 
needs to be posed, until communication can achieve a com-
fortable inoperativity, until there can be laughter because 
there’s love.
At bottom, she can stop asking the question of special-
ness. To be special is to be suffocated by the look. I know 
she doesn’t like that. Furthermore, she’s already singular. In 
singularity, there’s no pressure to avoid being common, for 
the common isn’t merely something in which one partakes, 
but creates. It’s from her that originality springs, for within 
her is an origin. True, she’ll have the question pertaining to 
desire for the next person she’ll be involved with. With 
some luck, that person will know how to listen, knowing 
that it’s wrong to force her to the other side of the partition 
if she isn’t ready to be there. Like the Sphinx, her enigma is 
apotropaic, and she should be protective. That’s important. 
And last, if I can be allowed one instance of conflating 
mythological flying things, both part bird, I hope that she 
becomes reborn from the fire that she’s endured. Birds have 
song because they belong to the element of the air.
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